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Abstract 
This paper examines the social efficiency of legal systems to punish entrepreneurs who 
expropriated from outside investors. Literature in this field focuses on a type of legal 
error in which authorities may fail to detect the expropriation. In contrast, I am also 
concerned with another type of legal error, in which authorities may mistakenly punish 
innocent entrepreneurs. The latter type of legal error discourages entrepreneurs from 
taking risks and this consequently decreases social surpluses. When businesses face 
larger risks, the latter type of legal error can be more serious and, therefore, authorities 
should place more weight on protecting innocent entrepreneurs. 
JEL Classification Numbers: G34, G38, K42.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the social efficiency of legal systems to punish entrepreneurs who 
expropriate from outside investors. Closest to my analysis is that of Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002), who incorporate elements of Becker’s (1968) framework into a 
corporate finance environment as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002) generate the following predictions: firms are larger, more valuable, 
and more plentiful, diversion of profits is lower, ownership concentration is lower, and 
stock markets are more developed in countries with better protection for outside 
investors.1 
     My analysis differs from Shleifer and Wolfenzon’s (2002) in the following 
respects. They focus on a type of legal error in which authorities may fail to detect 
expropriation by entrepreneurs. This means that better protection of outside investors 
reduces the probability of such legal errors. In contrast, I am also concerned with 
another type of legal error, in which authorities may mistakenly punish innocent 
entrepreneurs.2 This type of legal error discourages entrepreneurs from taking risks and, 
consequently, decreases social surpluses. I assume that the quality of legal systems is 
                                                
1 As empirical literature on investor protection, see La Porta et al. (1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002), 
Kumer et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Zingales (1994), and Wurgler (2000). 
2 Other papers that take the latter type of legal error into account are, for example, Craswell and Calfee 
(1986), Png (1986), Polinsky and Shavell (1989), Miceli (1990), Davis (1994), and Kaplow and Shavell 
(1994). 
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given by a pair of the following two likelihoods: the likelihood that entrepreneurs are 
caught and fined for expropriating from shareholders and the likelihood that innocent 
entrepreneurs are not found liable for business failure. Shleifer and Wolfenzon’s (2002) 
model of the quality of legal systems is only given by the former likelihood. 
     I then analyze the social welfare of improvements in legal systems, which is not 
examined in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). When businesses are safer, a 
results-oriented liability rule is more useful because a bad outcome is likely to reflect 
the fact that entrepreneurs have expropriated from shareholders. This rule requires 
authorities to automatically fine entrepreneurs when bad outcomes have occurred. 
However, when businesses face larger risks, a bad outcome may simply reflect the 
actual risks inherent in the business and, therefore, a results-oriented liability rule is 
likely to increase the possibility of the latter type of legal error (i.e., the possibility that 
authorities mistakenly find innocent entrepreneurs liable).3 As a result, entrepreneurs 
may refrain from undertaking risky businesses even if they are socially valuable. 
     In this case, authorities should place more weight on avoiding the latter type of 
                                                
3 For example, as demonstrated in Sawaguchi (2005), when a bank collapses, authorities tend to punish 
its directors for breaches of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, when a bank continues to operate, there is 
no case in which its directors are found liable even if its loans become uncollectible. This contrast seems 
to be unbalanced because ensuring that a bank does not collapse should be the absolute minimum 
requirement. Outsiders often have difficulty in distinguishing the difference between directors’ illegal 
behavior and their rational risk-taking behavior. This may induce authorities to choose a results-oriented 
liability rule. That is, after a bank collapses, authorities may punish its directors, irrespective of the extent 
to which they are liable for its failure. 
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legal error (i.e., on protecting innocent entrepreneurs), in order to improve the social 
efficiency of legal systems. Otherwise, the heavy penalties that are imposed on 
entrepreneurs who manage high-risk and high-return projects will become socially 
harmful. Thus, a reduction in such legal errors is a necessary condition to reinforce 
managerial liability rules. 
In section 2, I present a model of an entrepreneur going public with the legal 
protection of outside investors. In section 3, I derive the conditions under which a 
market equilibrium exists. In section 4, I derive a socially optimal legal system that 
maximizes social welfare by controlling the two types of legal error. Section 5 analyzes 
the effects of business risks on a socially optimal legal system. In addition, the social 
efficiency of fines imposed on entrepreneurs is examined. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The Model 
There are two dates, 1 and 2. Market participants, consisting of a single entrepreneur 
and outside investors, are risk-neutral and the discount rate is zero. At date 1, raising 
one unit of capital from outside investors, a firm controlled by the entrepreneur can 
implement a project that generates a date 2 revenue of 
€ 
1+ rH  with probability 
€ 
p and 
4
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€ 
1+ rL  (
€ 
= 0) with probability 
€ 
1− p . Keep the firm’s expected revenue, which is given 
by , constant at the level of ( ). Then, the firm’s expected revenue net of 
one unit of capital is positive: . To finance the project, the 
entrepreneur must sell a fraction, , of the firm’s equity to the capital market, where  
is endogenously determined.4 
     At date 1, the entrepreneur has the opportunity to divert the one unit of capital 
raised from the capital market instead of investing it in the project.5 Since the project 
may generate nothing with probability , the authorities cannot find the 
entrepreneur liable by the fact that the realized cash flow is zero. This is a source of 
legal error and therefore motivates the entrepreneur to expropriate shareholders.6 When 
the entrepreneur expropriates shareholders, the authorities fail to detect the 
expropriation with probability . When the entrepreneur honestly invests the capital 
in the project, the authorities mistakenly find the innocent entrepreneur liable with 
probability . Higher values of  and  correspond to improvements in legal 
                                                
4 As assumed in Zingales (1995), Bebchuk (1999), and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), the entrepreneur 
retains control of the firm regardless of the fraction of the cash flow rights outside investors purchase. 
5 Corporate directors are often sued for breach of due care. The entrepreneur’s diversion may also be 
regarded as his/her breach of due care. Assume that the one unit of capital raised from the market is paid 
to the entrepreneur as his/her compensation for monitoring the project. If the entrepreneur monitors the 
project at the cost of one unit of capital, he/she can increase the success probability of the project up to p. 
However, if the entrepreneur neglects the monitoring process, the project necessarily fails. The latter case 
can be regarded as the entrepreneur’s breach of due care. 
6 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) consider a firm generating a deterministic revenue. However, strictly 
speaking, if the firm’s revenue were deterministic, then the authorities would correctly perceive 
expropriation by the entrepreneur from the realized cash flow. In other words, the assumption of 
stochastic revenue seems to be a necessary condition for legal errors to occur. 
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右記の注4～6
の説明文は124
頁に掲載。
error.7 
     If the entrepreneur is found liable (even if he/she is innocent), he/she is forced to 
pay damages that the authorities infer the firm suffered from his/her diversion. The 
damages are measured by the expected revenue that the firm would have generated if 
the entrepreneur had not diverted the capital raised from the market, which is given by 
.8 Since 
€ 
1− x( )e  is paid to the entrepreneur as a shareholder, the net liability 
payments imposed on the entrepreneur are 
€ 
xe . In addition, the entrepreneur is forced to 
pay a fine of 
€ 
γe  to the authorities, where  can be regarded as the severity of fines 
imposed.9 However, if the authorities cannot detect expropriation by the entrepreneur, 
he/she keeps the entire diverted amount.10 
     Assume that  
     
€ 
1− 1e < γ <
1
1− p( ) 1− h( ) ,                                           (1) 
and 
     
€ 
3 − 2p
2 − p( ) 1+γp( ) ≤ e ≤
3 − p
2 − p .                                         (1’) 
                                                
7 Becker (1968) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) do not take into account the latter type of legal error 
for which the authorities find innocent entrepreneurs liable. 
8 For example, damages are imposed through civil lawsuits, including shareholder derivative actions. 
9 The fine depends on the total damage the firm suffered, which is given by , and not on the damage 
outside shareholders suffered, which is given by . As mentioned in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), 
most legal systems consider the penalty based on the damage done to the corporation: a separate legal 
person distinct from the legal personalities of its shareholders. Fines are imposed through administrative 
and/or criminal proceedings, such as a joint investigation by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
10 This paper assumes that the entrepreneur is not wealth-constrained. If this constraint is more binding, 
managerial liability rules are less effective to prevent the entrepreneur from diverting the capital raised. 
6
As shown later, inequality (1) is necessary to highlight the entrepreneur’s participation 
constraints. The first inequality of (1’) is necessary for a socially optimal legal system to 
have a unique internal solution. The second inequality assures that lowering  is 
always socially harmful. Strictly speaking,  seems to be upper-limited but not 
lower-limited. This is consistent with the fact that extremely heavy civil penalties are 
uncommon in most countries, as mentioned in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). 
Inequality (1’) states that lowering  cannot be socially justified even if it is possible. 
Then, the existing  can be regarded as constant by assuming that it is set to the upper 
limit.11  
Given  and , the entrepreneur decides whether or not to divert the one unit of 
capital that was raised from the market.12 If the entrepreneur chooses to divert the 
capital, then his/her net expected returns at date 2 are given by 
€ 
k 1− x( )p 1+ rH( ) +1− p 1+ rH( ) −γp 1+ rH( )[ ]
€ 
+ 1− k( )⋅ 1 
€ 
=1− kγe − ke x .                                                  (2) 
If the entrepreneur invests the capital in the project, then his/her net expected returns at 
                                                
11 For tractability purposes, I specify the relation between the damage the firm suffered and the fine 
imposed on the entrepreneur, as 
€ 
γe . However, there is no loss of generality in using this simplified 
setting. For example, even if the marginal fine increases with the damage the firm suffered, the following 
analysis is fundamentally unchanged. 
12 Since the firm’s revenue should be 
€ 
1+ rH  or zero, the authorities could correctly perceive diversion 
from the realized cash flow if the entrepreneur diverted only part of the capital raised from the market. 
Thus, the entrepreneur diverts all or nothing.   
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date 2 are 
    
€ 
p 1− x( ) 1+ rH( )
€ 
+ 1− p( )h⋅ 0
€ 
+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) 1− x( )p 1+ rH( ) − p 1+ rH( ) −γp 1+ rH( )[ ]  
€ 
= e 1− 1− p( ) 1− h( )γ − 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }x[ ].                            (3) 
Note that even if the entrepreneur is innocent, he/she is found liable and fined with 
probability . 
     The condition under which the entrepreneur has no incentive to divert the capital 
raised is (2) (3), which is equivalent to 
€ 
x ≤
e − 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − k{ }γe −1
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − k{ }e 
€ 
= F k,h, p( ) .                            (4) 
Since 
     
€ 
∂F
∂k =
1+γ( )e −1
e 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − k{ }
2
€ 
>
∂F
∂h = 1− p( )
∂F
∂k > 0,                     (5) 
an increase in k or h reduces the possibility that the entrepreneur diverts the capital and 
instead raises the possibility that he/she implements the project. This is because an 
increase in k increases the costs of diversion and an increase in h decreases the costs of 
taking business risks. However, the marginal effect of k is always larger than that of h, 
since a high k is always effective for the entrepreneur who diverts the capital, while a 
high h is effective for the entrepreneur who implements the project (i.e., who takes 
8
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business risks) only when the project fails. 
     Keeping 
€ 
p 1+ rH( )  constant at the level of 
€ 
e , consider the effect of a change in p 
on (4). A project with a high p (and with a low ) is of the low-risk and low-return 
type and a project with a low p (and with a high ) is of the high-risk and high-return 
type. Since 
     
€ 
1− h( )∂F
∂k > 0,                                               (6) 
an increase in p is similar to an increase in k or h in that it increases F and consequently 
restricts expropriation by the entrepreneur. In other words, a project with high-risk and 
high-return induces the entrepreneur to expropriate from the firm. 
     To motivate the entrepreneur who does not divert the capital to undertake the 
project, expression (3) must never be negative and this condition is equivalent to 
     
€ 
x ≤ 1− 1− p( ) 1− h( )γ1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( )
€ 
=G h, p( ).                                      (7) 
Inequality (1) assures  and thereby makes (7) consistent with . This 
means that a too high  discourages the entrepreneur from adopting the project, 
because the authorities may erroneously impose a higher fine of  on the 
entrepreneur despite the fact that he/she has not expropriated from the firm.  
Since 
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€ 
∂G
∂h =
1− p( ) 1+γ( )
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }
2 ,                                       (8) 
an increase in h encourages the entrepreneur who does not divert the capital to 
undertake the project (i.e., to take business risks inherent in the project). Note that a 
change in k has no effect on the above so-called “participation conditions” because G is 
irrelevant to k. Since 
     
€ 
∂G
∂p =
1− h( ) 1+γ( )
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }
2
€ 
=
1− h
1− p
∂G
∂h ,                              (9) 
an increase in p is similar to an increase in h in that it increases G and, consequently, 
encourages the entrepreneur who does not divert the capital to undertake the project. In 
other words, a project that is high-risk with high-returns discourages the entrepreneur 
from undertaking the project (i.e., from taking business risks inherent in the project). 
     On the condition that the project is implemented, outside investors investing in 
the project receive the following returns net of one unit of capital: 
     
€ 
px 1+ rH( ) + 1− p( )h⋅ 0
€ 
+ 1− p( ) 1− h( )xp 1+ rH( )
€ 
−1 
€ 
= xe 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ } −1, 
which is induced to be zero by the market arbitrage. Therefore,  satisfies 
     
€ 
x = 1
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }e 
,                                  (10) 
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which is less than unity because . It follows from (10) that 
     
€ 
∂H h, p( )
∂h
€ 
=
1− p
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }
2e 
.                                 (11) 
This means that an increase in h raises the fraction of the cash flow rights outside 
investors request because an increase in h virtually transfers the cash flow rights from 
the outside investors to the entrepreneur. 
 
3. The Market Equilibrium 
In this section, I derive the conditions under which there exists a market equilibrium 
satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints and the participation constraints. First, 
the condition under which the entrepreneur who can raise one unit of capital from the 
market never diverts it (i.e., the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint) is 
     
€ 
F k,h, p( ) ≥H h, p( ),                                              (12) 
which is given by (4) and (10). Next, the condition under which the entrepreneur who 
does not divert the capital raised receives a net non-negative return from the project (i.e., 
the entrepreneur’s participation constraint) is 
     
€ 
G h, p( ) ≥H h, p( ) ,                                                (13) 
which is given by (7) and (10). 
11
     Inequality (12) derives the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 (The entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraints): 
(a) The entrepreneur who can raise capital from the market necessarily 
implements the project (i.e., never diverts the capital) if and only if 
          
€ 
k ≥ a h, p( ) ,                                                (14) 
        where 
€ 
a h, p( ) =
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ } 2 − e ( ) + 1− p( ) 1− h( ) 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe 
1+ 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe 
. 
(b) an increase in k, h, or p raises the possibility that (14) is satisfied (i.e., 
€ 
a h, p( ) 
is decreasing with h or p), and 
€ 
0 < a h, p( ) < a 0, p( ) ≤1 for any h
€ 
∈ 0,1( ] . 
Proof: All proofs are contained in the Appendix. 
 
Thus, an increase in k (i.e., an improvement in legal error in which the authorities fail to 
detect the entrepreneur who expropriated from the firm) increases the costs of diverting 
the capital raised and thereby discourages the entrepreneur from diverting. An increase 
in h also alleviates incentive compatibility constraints because it encourages the 
entrepreneur to take the risks inherent in the project by improving the legal error that 
he/she is mistakenly punished when the project fails. An increase in p (i.e., a decrease in 
12
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the possibility of the project failure) has the same effects on incentive compatibility 
constraints as an increase in h, because an innocent entrepreneur is never punished, 
providing the project does not fail. As shown in Proposition 1, inequality (1’) assures 
that 
€ 
0 < a h, p( ) ≤1 holds for any h
€ 
∈ 0,1[ ]  and therefore k
€ 
∈ 0,1( ]  exists satisfying (14). 
Inequality (13) derives the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 (The entrepreneur’s participation constraints): 
(a) The entrepreneur who does not divert the capital raised receives a net 
non-negative return from the project if and only if  
     
€ 
1− p( ) 1− h( ) ≤ 1
γ
1− 1e 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ,                                          (15) 
     (b) an increase in h or p raises the possibility that (15) is satisfied. 
 
Thus, an increase in h (i.e., an improvement in legal error that the authorities mistakenly 
punish the entrepreneur despite he/she does not divert the capital raised) decreases the 
costs of taking business risks and thereby encourages the entrepreneur to undertake the 
project. Like incentive compatibility constraints, an increase in p (i.e., a decrease in the 
possibility of business failure) has the same effects on participation constraints as an 
increase in h, because an innocent entrepreneur is never punished as long as the project 
13
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does not fail. Note that inequality (15) assures (1). 
     For the remainder of the paper, assume that 
     
€ 
p <1− 1
γ
1− 1e 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ .                                                 (16) 
Inequality (16) means that, for any ( ), a too little h breaks the entrepreneur’s 
participation constraints, which are given by (15), and thereby highlights the gravity of 
legal error that an innocent entrepreneur will be erroneously punished. Note that 
inequality (1) assures 
€ 
1− 1
γ
1− 1e 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ > 0 and thereby makes (16) consistent with . 
Then, the following proposition derives a minimal level of h to assure the 
entrepreneur’s participation constraints.  
 
Proposition 3 (The minimal level of h satisfying the participation constraints):13 
     There exists a minimal level of h, which is given by  
€ 
1− 11− p( )γ 1−
1
e 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
€ 
∈ 0,1( ) , to assure the entrepreneur’s participation constraints:  
satisfies 
€ 
G h*, p( ) = H h*, p( )  and 
€ 
h < (>)h*
€ 
G h, p( ) < >( )H h, p( ) . 
 
     When , i.e., when h is a minimal level to assure the entrepreneur’s 
                                                
13 When 
€ 
γ ≤ 1− 1e , i.e., when a fine imposed on the entrepreneur is too low, (15) shows that his/her 
participation constraints are not binding. However, even in this case, the following analysis is invariant if 
€ 
h*  is replaced by zero. Note that inequality (1’) can hold for any 
€ 
γ ≥ 0 .  
14
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participation constraints, a minimal level exists of k to assure the entrepreneur’s 
incentive compatibility constraints. To prove this, I have derived the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: For any h
€ 
∈ 0,1[ ] , there exists a unique 
€ 
k = f h, p( ) ( ) which satisfies 
€ 
F f h, p( ),h, p( ) =G h, p( ) , where 
€ 
k < >( ) f h, p( )  
€ 
⇔ F k,h, p( ) < (>)G h, p( ) . 
 
Then, the following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 4 (The minimal level of k satisfying the entrepreneur’s incentive 
compatibility constraints when ): 
     When  (where 
€ 
G h*, p( ) = H h*, p( )), there exists a minimal level of k, 
which is given by 
€ 
k* = f h*, p( ) , to assure the entrepreneur’s incentive 
compatibility constraints:  satisfies 
€ 
F k*,h*, p( ) = H h*, p( )  and 
€ 
k < (>)k*  
€ 
F k*,h*, p( ) < >( )H h*, p( ) . 
 
     Thus, when inequalities (14) and (15) hold, the entrepreneur succeeds in raising 
funds from the market and implements the project (i.e., does not divert the funds). In 
particular, Propositions 3 and 4 show that a pair of 
€ 
k*,h*( )  yields 
€ 
F k*,h*, p( )  
15
133
€ 
=G h*, p( )
€ 
= H h*, p( )  and therefore satisfies the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility 
constraints and participation constraints. However, this does not mean that 
€ 
k*,h*( )  is 
socially optimal, even if authorities can choose the pair. As shown in the next section, 
another pair 
€ 
k,h( )  satisfying  and  may be socially optimal. 
 
4. The Social Optimality of Legal Systems 
In this section, I derive a socially optimal legal system (i.e., socially optimal levels of 
the probability for which the entrepreneur is found liable when he/she expropriated 
from the firm, which is given by k, and the probability that the entrepreneur is found 
innocent when he/she did not expropriate from the firm, which is given by h). First, let 
 and 
€ 
h0  denote the ex ante probability of k and h, respectively. If the authorities 
exert an effort with the cost of 
€ 
λ k 2 − k02( )  and 
€ 
h2 − h02 (where 
€ 
k ≥ k0 , 
€ 
h ≥ h0 , and 
€ 
λ > 0), they can raise 
€ 
k0 and 
€ 
h0  up to k and h, respectively. A large  means that 
raising k is more costly than raising h. Then, there exist socially optimal levels of k and 
h to assure incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints.14 To prove 
this, I derived the following lemma. 
 
                                                
14 Assume that 
€ 
k0 and 
€ 
h0  are sufficiently large, so that social welfare 
€ 
e −1− λ k 2 − k02( ) − h 2 − h02( ) is 
positive. 
16
Lemma 2: 
(a) For any h
€ 
∈ 0,1[ ] , there exists a unique 
€ 
k =
€ 
a h, p( )  (given by (14)) that 
satisfies 
€ 
F a h, p( ),h, p( )
€ 
= H h, p( ), 
    where ( )
€ 
a h, p( )⇔  
€ 
F k,h, p( ) < ( )
€ 
H h, p( ) , 
   
€ 
− 1− p( ) < ∂a h, p( )
∂h =
€ 
∂H h, p( ) ∂h
∂F k,h, p( ) ∂h −1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− p( ) < 0, 
    and 
€ 
∂ 2a h, p( )
∂h2 > 0 (See 
€ 
k = a h, p( )  in Figure 1). 
(b) For any constant c  and any 
€ 
h∈ 0, c[ ], there exists a unique 
€ 
k = b h,c( )  
that satisfies 
€ 
λ b h,c( ){ }
2
+ h2 , where 
€ 
∂b h,c( )
∂h
€ 
= −
h
λb h,c( ) < 0 , 
€ 
∂b h,c( )
∂c > 0 , and 
€ 
∂ 2b h,c( )
∂h2 < 0 (See 
€ 
k = b h,c**( )  in Figure 1).15 
(c) A pair of 
€ 
k,h( )  that minimizes 
€ 
λ k 2 − k02( ) + h2 − h02( )  conditional on 
€ 
F k,h, p( ) = H h, p( ), which is denoted by 
€ 
k**,h**( ) , is uniquely determined, 
as follows. 
 (i) If 
€ 
∂H 1, p( ) ∂h
∂F a 1, p( ),1, p( ) ∂h
−1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
1− p( ) > − 1
λa 1, p( ) , 
                                                
15 If 
€ 
k = b h,c( )  is decreasing and concave with h and increasing with c, the following analysis is 
invariant. However, by specifying the legal cost as 
€ 
λ k 2 − k02( ) + h 2 − h02( ) , Proposition 6 can lead to a 
clear condition, such as 
€ 
1− p0
2− p0 − p1
< h0** < 1. 
17
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 € 
∂H h**, p( ) ∂h
∂F k**,h**, p( ) ∂h
−1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
1− p( ) = − h
**
λk**                            (17) 
  is satisfied, where 
€ 
0 < h** <1 and 
€ 
0 < k** = a h**, p( )  (See Point A in 
  Figure 1). 
 (ii) If 
€ 
∂H 1, p( ) ∂h
∂F a 1, p( ),1, p( ) ∂h
−1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
1− p( ) ≤ − 1
λa 1, p( ) , 
€ 
h** =1 and 
€ 
0 < k** = 
  
€ 
a 1, p( ) <1 are satisfied. 
            
At A in Figure 1, a pair of 
€ 
k,h( )  that minimizes 
€ 
λ k 2 − k02( ) + h2 − h02( ) conditional on 
€ 
F k,h, p( ) = H h, p( ), which is denoted by 
€ 
k**,h**( ) , is uniquely determined. However, 
inequality (1’) assures 
€ 
a 1, p( ) = 2 − e 1+γe > 0  and therefore  may satisfy  for a 
sufficiently large . This means that if it is sufficiently more costly to find and punish 
entrepreneurs who have diverted than to protect innocent entrepreneurs (i.e., if  is 
sufficiently large), the authorities should shift priority from the former to the latter. 
Then, the following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 5 (A socially optimal legal system): 
     Socially optimal levels of k and h are as follows. 
18
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(a)  If 
€ 
h0 > h*  and 
€ 
k0 > f h0, p( ), the solution is 
€ 
k0,h0( ). 
(b)  If 
€ 
h0 > h*  and 
€ 
k0 ≤ f h0, p( ) , there are four cases: 
(i) If 
€ 
k0 > a h0, p( ), the solution is 
€ 
k0,h0( ). 
(ii) If 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h0, p( )  and 
€ 
h0 > h** , the solution is 
€ 
a h0, p( ),h0( ). 
(iii) If 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h0, p( ) , 
€ 
h0 ≤ h**  and 
€ 
k0 > a h**, p( ) , the solution is 
€ 
k0,a−1 k0, p( )( ) , where, taking p as given, 
€ 
a−1 k, p( )  is an inverse function of 
h. 
(iv) If 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h0, p( ) ,  and 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h**, p( ) , the solution is 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( ) . 
(c)  If  and 
€ 
k0 > f h*, p( ), the solution is 
€ 
k0,h*( ) . 
(d)  If 
€ 
h0 ≤ h*  and 
€ 
k0 ≤ f h*, p( ), there are three cases: 
(i) If 
€ 
h* > h**, the solution is 
€ 
f h*, p( ),h*( ). 
(ii) If 
€ 
h* ≤ h** and 
€ 
k0 > a h**, p( ) , the solution is 
€ 
k0,a−1 k0, p( )( ) . 
(iii) If 
€ 
h* ≤ h** and 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h**, p( ), the solution is 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( ) . 
 
As shown in this proposition, if 
€ 
max h0,h*{ } ≤ h**  and 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h**, p( ), there is 
a unique internal solution of 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( ) , where 
€ 
0 < a h**, p( ) <1 and 
€ 
0 < h** <1. 
This solution is denoted by A in Figure 1. At A, legal cost, denoted by 
€ 
c**
€ 
−λk02 − h02, is 
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minimized on the condition that 
€ 
F k,h, p( )
€ 
≥H h, p( )  and 
€ 
G h, p( ) ≥H h, p( ) , i.e., 
€ 
F a h**, p( ),h**, p( ) =
€ 
H h**, p( )  and 
€ 
G h**, p( ) > H h**, p( ). 
      
5. The Effects of Business Risks on a Socially Optimal Legal System 
To highlight the effects of business risks on a socially optimal legal system, I assume 
that there is a unique internal solution of 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( ) , i.e., that  
€ 
max h0,h*{ } ≤ h**  
and 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h**, p( )  are satisfied. An increase in business risks is represented by a 
decrease in p from  to  (where 
€ 
0 < p1 < p0 <1), conditional on the fixed . Let 
 and  denote  when  and , respectively, and let 
€ 
k0** =
€ 
a h0**, p0( )  and 
€ 
k1** = a h1**, p1( ) . A decrease in p is equivalent to a decrease in h 
and consequently lowers the quality of a legal system. Therefore, to improve a legal 
system, it seems to be necessary to raise k and/or h. However, the following suggestion 
is more drastic than this conjecture. 
 
Proposition 6 (The effects of business risks on a socially optimal legal system): When 
€ 
0 < p1 < p0 <1 and 
€ 
1− p0
2 − p0 − p1
< h0** <1, 
€ 
h1** > h0** and 
€ 
k1** < k0** are satisfied. 
 
     This proposition suggests that an increase in business risk (i.e., a decrease in p) 
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may require the authorities to protect entrepreneurs more and protect outside investors 
less (i.e., to raise h and to lower k). Inequality 
€ 
1− p0
2 − p0 − p1
< h0** <1 assures that at C in 
Figure 2, the slope of 
€ 
a h, p1( ) is steeper than that of 
€ 
b h,c( ) and, therefore, that  is 
down at the right-hand side of C, i.e., 
€ 
h0** < h1 < h1** and 
€ 
k0** > k1**. 
     By (17),  satisfies 
€ 
1− p0
2 − p0 − p1
<  for ’s belonging to an adequate 
range. Then, a unique 
€ 
h1∈ h0**,1( )  exists satisfying 
€ 
1− p0( ) 1− h0**( ) = 1− p1( ) 1− h1( ) . 
This leads to a pair of 
€ 
k1**  and 
€ 
h1**  satisfying 
€ 
0 < k1** < k0** <1  and 
€ 
1− p0
2 − p0 − p1
< h0** < h1 < h1** ≤1. Note that a pair of  and  need not to be an 
internal solution. 
     A decrease in 
€ 
p1 raises the possibility that 
€ 
h0** >
1− p0
2 − p0 − p1
. This means that 
when increases in business risks are larger, authorities should place more weight on 
protecting entrepreneurs who are innocent than on finding those who have diverted 
funds. An increase in business risks raises the possibility that innocent entrepreneurs 
consequently fail and therefore are mistakenly punished. This discourages entrepreneurs 
from working honestly and instead motivates them to divert funds. In addition, an 
increase in business risks reduces the possibility that entrepreneurs participate in the 
market. Thus, the authorities should devise a legal system that supports innocent 
entrepreneurs, in order to motivate them to take business risks. 
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     Until now, taking the severity of fines imposed on the entrepreneur, denoted by 
, as given, this paper has examined the two types of legal error. As mentioned in 
footnote 9, a sufficiently low  (i.e., a sufficiently low fine) can eliminate the 
entrepreneur’s participation constraints. However, this does not mean that a low fine is 
always socially favorable. It follows from (A1) in Proof of Proposition 1 that 
€ 
∂ F k,h, p( ) −H h, p( ){ }
∂γ
=
k − 1− p( ) 1− h( )
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − k . Therefore, if and only if 
€ 
k < 
€ 
1− p( ) 1− h( ) , a lower  alleviates the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility 
constraints and therefore can be socially favorable.  
     Then, the following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 7 (The social optimality of fines imposed on the entrepreneur): 
     When the existing  is set to the upper limit, which is given by , but it is not 
lower-limited, the following hold. 
(a) If inequality (1’) is satisfied (i.e., if 
€ 
3 − 2p
2 − p( ) 1+γp( ) ≤ e ≤
3 − p
2 − p ), 
€ 
γ = γ  is 
socially optimal (See Case (a) in Figure 3). 
(b) If 
€ 
3 − p
2 − p < e < 2, the socially optimal  is as follows (See Case (b) in Figure 
3). 
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(i) If 
€ 
h** ≤ ˆ h =1− 2 − e 1− p( ) e −1( )  when 
€ 
γ = γ , 
€ 
γ = 0  is socially optimal. 
(ii) If 
€ 
h** > ˆ h =1− 2 − e 1− p( ) e −1( )  when 
€ 
γ = γ , 
€ 
γ = γ  is socially optimal. 
(c) If 
€ 
e ≥ 2 , 
€ 
γ = 0  is always socially optimal (See Case (c) in Figure 3). 
 
Thus, inequality (1’) assures that the existing 
€ 
γ = γ  is socially optimal and therefore 
can be regarded as constant. In this case, a lower fine is always socially harmful. 
     In contrast, when 
€ 
3 − p
2 − p < e < 2  and 
€ 
h**  is sufficiently low, i.e., when the 
business is of the high-risk and high-return type and the legal error is serious for which 
innocent entrepreneurs are mistakenly punished, a lower fine is socially favorable. In 
this case, fines imposed on the entrepreneur discourage him/her from taking business 
risks. When 
€ 
e ≥ 2 , setting 
€ 
γ = 0  induces the entrepreneur to always implement the 
project. In this case, the entrepreneur can gain more from undertaking the project than 
from diverting the one unit of capital raised. 
     As a rule, when authorities cannot reduce the legal error for which innocent 
entrepreneurs are mistakenly punished, they should refrain from imposing heavy 
penalties on entrepreneurs who manage high-risk and high-return projects. In other 
words, an reduction in such legal errors can be a necessary condition to reinforce 
managerial liability rules. 
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 6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the social efficiency of legal systems to punish entrepreneurs 
who expropriated from outside investors. The literature concerning this field focuses on 
a type of legal error in which authorities may fail to detect expropriation. In contrast to 
this single focus, I am additionally concerned with another type of legal error, in which 
authorities may mistakenly punish innocent entrepreneurs. The latter type of legal error 
discourages entrepreneurs from taking risks and, consequently, decreases social 
surpluses. In particular, when businesses face larger risks, the latter type of legal error 
can be more serious than the former and, therefore, authorities should place more 
weight on protecting entrepreneurs who are innocent than on finding and punishing 
those who have diverted funds. 
     However, the above policy may be in opposition to public opinion. When 
business risks are increasing, outside investors often incur great losses and therefore are 
likely to put pressure on authorities to place more weight on punishing entrepreneurs 
who have diverted funds than on protecting innocent entrepreneurs. Even if it is socially 
efficient to shift the priority from punishing entrepreneurs who have diverted funds to 
protecting innocent entrepreneurs, such a policy change can be harmful to outside 
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investors, since it transfers the revenue of firms from them to entrepreneurs. 
     Thus, authorities should reduce the legal error of innocent entrepreneurs being 
mistakenly found liable. Otherwise, the heavy penalties that are imposed on 
entrepreneurs who manage high-risk and high-return projects will become socially 
harmful. This means that a reduction in such legal errors is a necessary condition to 
reinforce managerial liability rules. In this situation, investors who are tolerant towards 
business risks, such as venture capitalists, can play an important role in devising a 
socially efficient legal system and financing high-risk and high-return businesses. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
     (a) It follows from (4) and (10) that 
     
€ 
F k,h, p( ) −H h, p( ) 
€ 
=
k 1+ 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe [ ] − 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ } 2 − e ( ) − 1− p( ) 1− h( ) 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe 
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − k{ } 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }e 
. 
                                                                   (A1) 
Therefore, 
€ 
F k,h, p( ) ≥H h, p( ) is equivalent to (14). 
 
(b) The left hand side of (14) is increasing with k . On the other hand,  
     
€ 
∂a h, p( )
∂h
€ 
= −
n h, p( )
1+ 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe [ ]
2 1− p( ) , 
where 
€ 
n h, p( ) = 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }
2
γe ( )2 + 1+ 2 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe + 2 − e . By (1’), 
€ 
n h, p( )  and therefore 
€ 
∂a h, p( )
∂h < 0. Since 
€ 
∂a h, p( )
∂p =
1− h
1− p
∂a h, p( )
∂h , 
€ 
∂a h, p( )
∂p < 0  is 
also satisfied. Hence, the right hand side of (14) is decreasing with h and p. 
     Inequality (1’) leads to 
€ 
0 < a h, p( ) < a 0, p( ) ≤1 for any h
€ 
∈ 0,1( ] . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (a) follows because substituting (7) and (10) into (13) yields 
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(15). Part (b) follows because the left hand side of (15) is decreasing with h and p. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: It follows from (7) and (10) that 
€ 
G h*, p( ) = H h*, p( )  and 
€ 
h < (>)h*
€ 
G h, p( ) < >( )H h, p( ) . Inequality (16) assures 
€ 
0 < h* <1. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
It follows from (4), (5) and (7) that 
€ 
∂F
∂k > 0 , 
€ 
F 0,h, p( )
€ 
= G h, p( ) − 11+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }e 
€ 
<G h, p( ), 
€ 
F 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ),h, p( ) =
€ 
>G h, p( ), 
and therefore a unique 
€ 
f h, p( )(
€ 
> 0) exists, satisfying Lemma 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
By Lemma 1, a unique 
€ 
k* = f h*, p( ) (
€ 
> 0) exists, satisfying 
€ 
F k*,h*, p( ) =G h*, p( )  and 
€ 
⇔ F k,h*, p( ) < >( )G h*, p( ) . Proposition 3 leads to 
€ 
G h*, p( ) = H h*, p( ) . Hence, 
 satisfies 
€ 
F k*,h*, p( ) = H h*, p( )  and 
€ 
k < (>)k*
€ 
⇔
€ 
F k,h*, p( ) < >( )
€ 
H h*, p( ) . In 
addition, Part (b) of Proposition 1 and 
€ 
0 < h* <1 assures 
€ 
0 < k* <1.  
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Proof of Lemma 2: 
     (a) By (14), 
€ 
F a h, p( ),h, p( )
€ 
= H h, p( )  and 
€ 
k < (>)a h, p( )⇔ F k,h, p( ) < (>) 
€ 
H h, p( ) . It follows from Proof of Part (b) of Proposition 1 that 
     
€ 
n h, p( ) < 1+ 1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }γe [ ]
2
 
and therefore 
€ 
− 1− p( ) < ∂a h, p( )
∂h < 0 . Differentiating 
€ 
F a h, p( ),h, p( )
€ 
= H h, p( )  with 
respect to h and using (5) yields 
€ 
∂a h, p( )
∂h
€ 
=
∂H h, p( ) ∂h
∂F k,h, p( ) ∂h −1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− p( ) .                               (A2) 
By (A2) and 
€ 
∂2F ∂h2 = 1− p( )⋅ ∂2F ∂h∂k ,  
€ 
∂2a h, p( )
∂h2 =
€ 
1− p
∂F ∂h( )2
€ 
∂ 2H
∂h2
∂F
∂h −
∂H
∂h
∂ 2F
∂h2 +
∂ 2F
∂h∂k
∂a
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
       
€ 
=
1− p
∂F ∂h( )2
∂2H
∂h2
∂F
∂h 1−
∂2F
∂h2
∂H
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2 ∂2H
∂h2
∂F
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
. 
By (5), (11), 
€ 
∂2F
∂h2 =
2 1− p( )2 1+γ( )e −1{ }
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − k{ }
3e 
, and 
€ 
∂2H
∂h2 =
2 1− p( )2
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ }
3e 
, it is 
satisfied that 
€ 
∂2F
∂h2
∂H
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2 ∂2H
∂h2
∂F
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
€ 
=
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ) − a h, p( )
1+ 1− p( ) 1− h( ){ } 1+γ( )e −1{ }
. By (14), 
€ 
∂2F
∂h2
∂H
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2 ∂2H
∂h2
∂F
∂h
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 if and only if 
€ 
γ 1+γ( )e −1{ } > 0 . Therefore, for any , 
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 (See 
€ 
k = a h, p( )  in Figure 1).16 
     (b) For any 
€ 
h∈ 0, c[ ], a unique 
€ 
k = c − h2( ) λ  
€ 
= b h,c( )  exists that satisfies 
€ 
λ b h,c( ){ }
2
+ h2 = c . Differentiating 
€ 
λ b h,c( ){ }
2
+ h2
€ 
= cwith respect to h and  yields 
€ 
∂b h,c( )
∂h
€ 
= −
h
λb h,c( ) < 0  and 
€ 
∂b h,c( )
∂c =
1
2λb h,c( ) > 0 , respectively. In addition, 
€ 
∂ 2b h,c( )
∂h2
€ 
−
λ b h,c( ){ }
2
+ h2
λ2 b h,c( ){ }
3 < 0 (See 
€ 
k = b h,c**( )  in Figure 1). 
     (c) It follows from Part (b) of Propositions 1 that for any 
€ 
h∈ 0,1( ] , 
€ 
0 < a h, p( ) <1. Subcase (i) follows because if 
€ 
∂a 1, p( )
∂h >
∂b 1, p( )
∂h , Parts (a) and (b) lead 
to 
€ 
0 < h** <1  and 
€ 
0 < k** = a h**, p( ) <1 . Subcase (ii) follows because if 
€ 
∂a 1, p( )
∂h ≤
∂b 1, p( )
∂h , 
€ 
h** =1 and 
€ 
0 < k** = a 1, p( ) = 2 − e 1+γe <1 are satisfied. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
     (a) If 
€ 
h0 > h*  and 
€ 
k0 > f h0, p( ) , then 
€ 
F k0,h0, p( ) >
€ 
G h0, p( ) >
€ 
H h0, p( )  is 
satisfied and therefore an initial condition, which is given by 
€ 
k0,h0( ) , is socially 
optimal subject to 
€ 
h ≥max h0,h*{ }  and 
€ 
k ≥ k0 . 
     (b) If 
€ 
h0 > h*  and 
€ 
k0 ≤ f h0, p( ) , then 
€ 
G h0, p( ) > H h0, p( )  and 
€ 
F k0,h0, p( ) ≤  
€ 
G h0, p( )  are satisfied and therefore the participation constraints hold but the incentive 
                                                
16 When , 
€ 
a h, p( )  is a decreasing and linear function of h. However, even in this case, Part (c) 
can be satisfied. 
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右記の注16の
説明文は143頁
に掲載。
compatibility constraints does not necessarily hold. 
       (i) If 
€ 
k0 > a h0, p( )  (i.e., 
€ 
F k0,h0, p( )
€ 
> H h0, p( )), the incentive compatibility 
constraints also hold and therefore a pair of  is socially optimal. 
       (ii) If 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h0, p( )  (i.e., 
€ 
F k0,h0, p( ) ≤
€ 
H h0, p( ) ) and 
€ 
h0 > h** , a pair of 
€ 
a h0, p( ),h0( )  leads to 
€ 
F a h0, p( ),h0, p( )
€ 
= H h0, p( )  and 
€ 
G h0, p( ) > H h0, p( )  and 
therefore is socially optimal. Note that 
€ 
k0 ≤
€ 
a h0, p( )
€ 
< a h*, p( )
€ 
<1. 
       (iii) If 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h0, p( )  (i.e., 
€ 
F k0,h0, p( ) ≤
€ 
H h0, p( ) ), 
€ 
h0 ≤ h**  and 
€ 
k0 >  
€ 
a h**, p( ) , a pair of 
€ 
k0,a−1 k0, p( )( )  leads to 
€ 
F k0,a−1 k0, p( ), p( ) = H a−1 k0, p( ), p( )  and 
€ 
G a−1 k0, p( ), p( )
€ 
> H a−1 k0, p( ), p( ) . Note that the cost of 
€ 
k0,a−1 k0, p( )( )  is less than that 
of 
€ 
k0,h**( ) since 
€ 
h0 < a−1 k0, p( ) < h**. 
       (iv) If 
€ 
h0 ≤ h** and 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h**, p( ) are satisfied, a pair of 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( )  can 
be chosen and is socially optimal. Note that 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( )  assures that 
€ 
F a h**, p( ),h**( ) = H a h**, p( ),h**( ) and 
€ 
G a h**, p( ),h**( ) > H a h**, p( ),h**( ). 
(c) If 
€ 
h0 ≤ h*  and 
€ 
k0 > f h*, p( ) = a h*, p( ) , then 
€ 
F k0,h*, p( ) >
€ 
G h*, p( )
€ 
= 
€ 
H h*, p( ) is satisfied and therefore a pair of 
€ 
k0,h*( )  is socially optimal subject to 
€ 
h ≥max h0,h*{ }  and 
€ 
k ≥ k0 . 
(d) If 
€ 
h0 ≤ h*  and 
€ 
k0 ≤ f h*, p( ) = a h*, p( ) , it is satisfied that 
€ 
F k0,h*, p( ) ≤  
€ 
G h*, p( ) =
€ 
H h*, p( ) . A pair of 
€ 
f h*, p( ),h*( )  assures that 
€ 
F f h*, p( ),h*, p( ) =  
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€ 
G h*, p( ) =
€ 
H h*, p( ), but is not necessarily socially optimal. 
(i) If 
€ 
h* > h** , 
€ 
f h*, p( ),h*( ) is socially optimal subject to 
€ 
h ≥ h* . 
       (ii) If 
€ 
h* ≤ h** and 
€ 
k0 > a h**, p( ) , a pair of 
€ 
k0,a−1 k0, p( )( )  is socially optimal 
subject to 
€ 
k ≥ k0  and 
€ 
h ≥ a−1 k0, p( ). Note that 
€ 
h* ≤
€ 
a−1 k0, p( ) <
€ 
h**. 
       (iii) If 
€ 
h* ≤ h** and 
€ 
k0 ≤ a h**, p( ), a pair of 
€ 
a h**, p( ),h**( )  is socially optimal 
(See Part (iv) of (b)). 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
     Let 
€ 
J k,h, p( )  denote 
     
€ 
J k,h, p( ) = ∂H h, p( ) ∂h
∂F k,h, p( ) ∂h −1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
1− p( ) . 
It follows from (5), (11), and (17) that 
     
€ 
J k0**,h0**, p0( ) =
€ 
1+ 1− p0( ) 1− h0**( ) − k0**{ }
2
1+γ( )e −1{ } 1+ 1− p0( ) 1− h0**( ){ }
2 −1
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
1− p0( )
€ 
= −
h0**
λk0**
. 
Consider 
€ 
h1 that satisfies 
€ 
1− p0( ) 1− h0**( ) = 1− p1( ) 1− h1( ) , where 
€ 
1 > p0 > p1 > 0 and 
€ 
0 < h0** <
€ 
h1
€ 
<1. Then, it follows from (4) and (10) that 
€ 
k0** = a h1, p1( ) (See Point C in 
Figure 2). If and only if 
€ 
J k0**,h1, p1( ) < −
h1
λk0**
, 
€ 
0 < k1** < k0**  and 
€ 
1≥ h1** > h1  are 
satisfied (Point  is down at the right hand side of Point C). Since 
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€ 
J k0**,h1, p1( ) =
1+ 1− p1( ) 1− h1( ) − k0**{ }
2
1+γ( )e −1{ } 1+ 1− p1( ) 1− h1( ){ }
2 −1
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
1− p1( )  
               
€ 
= J k0**,h0, p0( )⋅
1− p1
1− p0
€ 
= −
h0**
λk0**
€ 
1− p1
1− p0
, 
and 
€ 
h1 =1−
1− p0( ) 1− h0**( )
1− p1
€ 
∈ h0**,1( ) , inequality 
€ 
J k0**,h1, p1( ) < −
h1
λk0**
 is equivalent to  
€ 
h0** >
1− p0
2 − p0 − p1
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
     (a) Inequality (1’) leads to 
€ 
a 0, p( ) ≥1− p , and therefore 
€ 
k = a h, p( ) > 
€ 
1− p( ) 1− h( )  for any h
€ 
∈ 0,1( ] , which is given by Part (a) of Lemma 2 (See Case (a) in 
Figure 3). This means that a higher 
€ 
γ  is socially favorable. However, 
€ 
γ = γ  is the 
upper limit and therefore socially optimal. 
     (b) In this case, 
€ 
a 0, p( ) <1− p  and 
€ 
a 1, p( ) > 0 are satisfied. Therefore, a unique 
pair of 
€ 
ˆ k ∈ 0,1( )  and 
€ 
ˆ h ∈ 0,1( )  exists satisfying 
€ 
ˆ k = a ˆ h , p( ) = 1− p( ) 1− ˆ h ( )  and 
 (See Case (b) in Figure 3). It follows from (14) that 
€ 
ˆ k , ˆ h ( ) = 2 − e e −1 ,1−
2 − e 
1− p( ) e −1( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . Let 
€ 
h** •( )  and 
€ 
a h, p,•( )  denote 
€ 
h**  and 
€ 
a h, p( ) 
when 
€ 
γ = • , respectively. Then, 
     
€ 
h < (>) ˆ h ⇔
€ 
∂a h, p,γ( )
∂γ
> (<)0,                                     (A3) 
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(i.e., 
€ 
a h, p,γ( )  is increasing (decreasing) with 
€ 
γ ).  
(i) When 
€ 
h** γ ( ) ≤ ˆ h , it follows from (17) that 
         
€ 
∂a h** γ ( ), p,γ ( )
∂h = −
h** γ ( )
λa h** γ ( ), p,γ ( )
, 
and therefore 
         
€ 
∂a ˆ h , p,γ ( )
∂h ≥ −
ˆ h 
λa ˆ h , p,γ ( )
€ 
= −
ˆ h 
λ 1− p( ) 1− ˆ h ( )
. 
By (A3), 
€ 
∂a ˆ h , p,γ( )
∂h >
∂a ˆ h , p,γ ( )
∂h  holds for any 
€ 
γ ∈ 0,γ [ ) . This means that for any 
€ 
γ ∈ 0,γ [ ) , 
         
€ 
∂a ˆ h , p,γ( )
∂h > −
ˆ h 
λa ˆ h , p,γ( )
= −
ˆ h 
λ 1− p( ) 1− ˆ h ( )
, 
and therefore that 
€ 
h** γ( ) < ˆ h  (i.e., 
€ 
a h** γ( ), p,γ( ) < 1− p( ) 1− h** γ( ){ }) is satisfied for 
any 
€ 
γ ∈ 0,γ [ ) . Hence, 
€ 
γ = 0  is socially optimal. 
        (ii) When 
€ 
h** γ ( ) > ˆ h , 
€ 
a h** γ ( ), p,γ ( ) > 1− p( ) 1− h** γ ( ){ }  holds. Hence, 
€ 
γ = γ  is socially optimal. 
     (c) When 
€ 
e ≥ 2 , setting 
€ 
γ = 0  leads to (2)  (3) for any 
€ 
k ∈ 0,1[ ]  and 
€ 
h∈ 0,1[ ]. 
Therefore, no fine is socially optimal to motivate the entrepreneur to honestly 
implement the project (See Case (c) in Figure 3). 
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Figure 1: A socially optimal legal system 
 
 
 
   
 
 A 
1     
€ 
a h*, p( ) = f h*, p( )   
150
  
 
                                           
             k 
 
                                                      
                                         
€ 
k = a h, p1( )           
                                             
            	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	          
€ 
k = a h, p0( ) 
                                                   
                                                                       
                                                             
 	  	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  h  
                            
Figure 2: The effects of business risk on a socially optimal legal system 
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Figure 3: Social optimality of fines imposed on the entrepreneur 
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